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PURSUING DIVERSITY:  FROM EDUCATION TO EMPLOYMENT 
Amy L. Wax 
A core ideal of Anglo-American law is that legal wrongs should be 
remedied by restoring the injured victim to the “rightful position.”  
That position is defined as the one the victim would have occupied had 
the legal injury never been inflicted. This aspiration has exerted a 
powerful influence on American legal practice across the board.  
Although, curiously, the phrase “rightful position” barely figures in 
cases or executive orders applying federal civil-rights laws, the 
restorative imperative embodied in that concept has exerted an 
important influence on their administrative and judicial application. 
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
question loomed large of how to define the “rightful position” for the 
targets of unlawful discrimination, exclusion, and ill treatment, and 
especially for Blacks. What should be the touchstone for full correction, 
and thus racial justice?  The answer that soon took hold was that 
Blacks would occupy the same social, educational, and occupational 
positions as Whites.  Perhaps the closest to a formal expression of this 
concept was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s famous speech at Howard 
University articulating as the goal of the federal civil-rights laws not 
just “equality as a right and a theory,” but “equality as a fact and 
equality as a result.”   
 The “equality as a fact” benchmark necessarily raised the question 
of how to achieve that result for victims of racial bias and 
discrimination.  A consensus grew that the desired outcome demanded 
more than the legal command to stop discriminating.  Reversing and 
undoing the lingering vestiges of past wrongs would be required.  This 
in turn would call for the adoption of race-conscious measures across 
multiple domains.  As Justice Harry Blackmun stated in Bakke v. 
Regents of the University of California in 1978, “In order to get beyond 
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.”  The 
practice of affirmative action, or reverse discrimination, was born of 
this idea.  
Although specific, limited, and targeted race-conscious remedies 
were not hard to reconcile with established legal-equitable principles, 
formidable obstacles existed—political, doctrinal, and practical—to the 
aggressive pursuit of “equality of result” through the systematic use of 
race preferences.  Much of the public remained wedded to 
individualist, impartial ideals of meritocratic selection that tolerated 
expanded opportunities but resisted “hard” measures like racial quotas 
or racial proportionality.  Retrofitting remedial doctrines designed to 
redress well-defined, individual injuries to more nebulous group harms 
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proved controversial and perplexing.  Courts grappled with whether 
specific proof of discrimination, as opposed to vague allegations of 
societal racism, should be required.  They also considered whether 
race-conscious orders could properly be imposed on entities never 
demonstrated to violate the law or in favor of persons never shown to 
have suffered actual discrimination.  On the practical level, the 
“rightful position” project was stymied by entrenched customs, outright 
resistance, and Blacks’ lack of readiness to step into a full range of 
social and economic roles due to poor education and skills.  Attempts to 
grapple with these realities produced policies of mixed efficacy and a 
tangle of conflicting and confusing court decisions. 
Confounding this project in the important employment realm was a 
Civil Rights Act provision, Section 703(j) of Title VII, that disavowed 
any requirement that an employer “grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group” due to racial imbalances in the 
workplace.  The executive branch, in enforcing the law, effectively 
ignored and repeatedly flouted the clause’s limitations by demanding 
that businesses and other employing entities address lopsided racial 
representation regardless of whether discrimination was shown to be 
the cause.  In The Affirmative Action Puzzle, a recent history of 
affirmative action, Melvin Urofsky quotes an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) staff member’s statement from the 
1970s that his agency treated the antipreference bar in the statute as 
“a big zero a nothing, a nullity.  [It doesn’t] mean anything to us.”  
Accordingly, the EEOC and an expanding network of federal offices 
and agencies proceeded to impose on businesses, corporations, and 
educational institutions ever more intrusive and onerous 
requirements, including hiring quotas, targets, and timetables as well 
as massive paperwork and documentation.    
Judicial practice was more equivocal.  Through a welter of fractured 
rulings in employment, business set-asides, and education, the courts 
and the Supreme Court established a set of rules permitting some 
types of race-conscious remedial orders to rectify proven statutory 
violations, and at times allowing voluntary affirmative-action 
programs in the absence of adjudicated legal infractions.  Judicially 
crafted limitations on such programs included the requirements of 
showing some evidence of past or present discrimination beyond 
statistical imbalances, avoiding inflexible quotas and numerical 
targets, tailoring race-conscious measures as narrowly as possible, and 
applying them only temporarily.  These strictures were not always 
consistently applied, which created uncertainty for economic actors 
subject to their mandates. 
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The early affirmative-action cases were primarily about jobs and 
businesses. By the 1990s, the action had shifted decisively to education 
and a new justification for race-conscious measures entered the 
picture: diversity.   Initially developed within academia itself, that idea 
was put forward in Justice Lewis Powell’s famous concurring opinion 
in the 1978 case of Bakke, which struck down a quota-based 
affirmative-action plan at the University of California at Davis Medical 
School.  Justice Powell suggested that, even if rigid quotas were legally 
verboten, race-based educational selection could be justified as a device 
to create a diverse student body.  Being exposed to students from 
various backgrounds carried pedagogical value and enhanced the 
educational experience.  It followed that creating student diversity, 
which delivered those benefits, was a goal that was “compelling” 
enough to overcome the law’s colorblind imperatives.  Powell cited as 
exemplary the flexible, individualized admission protocol at Harvard 
College, which used race as one factor among many to craft a class 
representing a range of backgrounds, talents, and experiences. 
Diversity quickly became the central pillar of the Supreme Court’s 
educational affirmative-action jurisprudence, with a majority of the 
Court officially recognizing educational diversity as justifying some 
degree of race-conscious student selection.  At the same time, the Court 
imported the prior touchstones of a bar on rigid quotas and the 
expectation of narrow tailoring of racial methods.  Although appearing 
to place genuine limits on the use of affirmative action in the 
educational setting, several aspects of the Supreme Court’s key rulings 
on the issue, including Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and the Fisher line 
of cases (Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher I (2013) and Fisher II 
(2016)) gave universities wide discretion to structure their admissions 
criteria pretty much as they wished.  These included the open-ended 
and ill-defined nature of diversity, its elevation to a constitutional 
“compelling interest,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s language in 
Grutter deferring to educational “expert” judgment, and the Court’s 
repeated failure to demand specific evidence of diversity’s actual 
benefits and efficacy.  This situation earned scathing contempt from 
Justice Antonin Scalia, who repeatedly questioned university officials 
and other supposed educational “experts” averments of the value of 
diversity and regarded the elevation of that “compelling interest” as a 
pretext for the Court’s imposition of its political preferences.1  
Justice O’Connor famously stated in her plurality opinion in 
Grutter that she expected that affirmative action would no longer be 
 
1 See Amy L. Wax, Trust Me, I’m an Expert: Scientific and Legal Expertise in 
Scalia’s Jurisprudence, in Scalia’s Constitution (Paul E. Peterson & Michael 
W. McConnell, eds. 2018). 
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needed after twenty-five years.  Albeit well-meaning, Justice 
O’Connor’s statement represents a misunderstanding of the 
implications and import of the Court’s adoption of diversity rather 
than remediation as the centerpiece of educational affirmative-action 
jurisprudence.  O’Connor’s prediction is grounded in the logic of 
remediation and thus unavoidably informed by the “rightful position” 
idea.  The logic of rightful position remediation dictates that proper 
remedies—and especially those that deviate from and go beyond the 
law’s mandates—can be justified only if they are designed eventually 
to achieve the promised result, which is to undo the injuries inflicted 
by a wrong.  The objective of race-conscious measures to correct the 
wrongs of racial discrimination is to enable Blacks to catch up with 
other groups to the point where they can compete by dint of their own 
efforts and take their rightful place in society under their own steam.  
Once that point is reached and the damage fully undone, affirmative 
action will no longer be needed.  But diversity as the main rationale for 
race-consciousness provides no reason to believe that affirmative 
action will reach that end point.  Diversity neither promises nor 
requires group uplift or equalization.  It rests on the educational value 
of Blacks’ institutional presence, not on the promise of undoing past 
harms or making Blacks as capable, academically or otherwise, as 
other groups.  Diversity, unlike remediation, thus entails no prediction 
that affirmative action will someday be unnecessary and will be 
phased out.  Although the point seems not to have been fully 
appreciated by Justice O’Connor or by those who repeat Justice 
O’Connor’s famous mantra, identifying diversity as the main rationale 
for educational affirmative action is fully compatible with affirmative 
action in perpetuity. 
Continuing social and educational trends reaffirm “affirmative 
action forever” as the most realistic future scenario.  Despite the initial 
exuberance of the Civil Rights era, it has become increasingly clear 
that the holy grail of steady racial progress towards “equality in fact” 
has remained elusive across multiple domains.  More broadly, the high 
hopes surrounding race preferences in education and other arenas to 
effect enough social and economic progress in the Black community to 
close existing gaps have not been realized.  Blacks as a group continue 
to suffer disproportionately from poverty, high crime rates, family 
breakdown, and low male workforce participation.  In the education 
sphere specifically, Blacks on average still lag behind Whites and 
Asian Americans in standard measures of learning, ability, and 
academic proficiency, such as national K–12 achievement tests, SATs, 
LSATs, MCATS, and GREs.  Observed differences are pervasive:  even 
controlling for socioeconomic status and factors such as family income, 
school quality, and neighborhood residence, Blacks underperform other 
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groups academically, often by a significant margin, in virtually every 
public-school district in the United States.  Average differences 
translate into a stark undercount of Blacks in the higher academic 
ranks nationwide.  This means that, without affirmative action, Blacks 
will be severely underrepresented at competitive and selective 
institutions that rely heavily on standard measures of academic ability 
and achievement.   
Whatever the etiology of existing disparities—and factors such as 
racism, poverty, culture, and innate group differences have been 
cited—they have proved highly resistant to elimination or even 
enduring narrowing through instruments of law and policy.  Little 
progress has been made in the past few decades towards closing 
observed racial gaps in multiple dimensions despite the widespread 
adoption of affirmative action in educational programs as well as in 
other sectors.  These are the realities on the ground that continue to 
make affirmative action necessary for generating a so-called “critical 
mass” of Blacks in selective universities. In sum, current developments 
belie Justice O’Connor’s prediction that affirmative action will 
eventually be phased out some time soon.   
I.  CHALLENGES WITH PRIORITIZING DIVERSITY 
In the meanwhile, the shift from remediation to diversity as the 
central doctrinal rationale for educational affirmative action has had 
several practical and legal consequences in light of important social 
changes that have occurred.  In recent decades, a surge in immigration 
has produced unprecedented levels of demographic diversity.  The 
growing numbers of potential students from a variety of ethnicities, 
backgrounds, and identity groups are in a position to contribute to the 
diversity of educational institutions.  Although the situation is 
complex, the great majority of these groups have more or less 
surpassed American-born Blacks in achievement, income, employment 
participation, and occupational status.  By enhancing the salience of 
some groups’ relative success in light of difficult circumstances and 
hardships, the diversity goal has threatened to draw attention away 
from the civil-rights focus on Blacks’ plight and to dilute Blacks’ 
primacy as uniquely deserving.  And the increasingly multicultural 
landscape has also thrown into renewed relief the ongoing and 
seemingly recalcitrant educational deficits in the Black community and 
the failure of decades of public and private initiatives to close existing 
racial gaps.   
The pressure to maintain what is considered a desirable student 
mix, including a significant presence of relatively underperforming 
Blacks and Hispanics in the face of growing competition, especially 
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from Asian Americans, has induced universities to become both more 
aggressive and less forthright about their emphasis on race relative to 
other conventional academic factors in their admissions practices.  
This has elicited backlash in the form of proposed referenda and 
legislative initiatives at the state level to curtail the use of race by 
public universities in admissions and other programs.  Some of these 
have succeeded.  More recently, efforts to reduce race preferences have 
taken the form of legal action, including a high-profile lawsuit by an 
Asian-American advocacy group claiming that Harvard University 
discriminates against Asian Americans in its admissions process in 
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  The Justice Department 
Civil Rights Division also just commenced an investigation of Yale 
University.  Although the Division’s August 2020 letter questioning 
Yale’s admissions practices stopped short of declaring that race could 
never be taken into account, it argued that Yale violated Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act by routinely making race a “determinative factor” in 
its admissions decisions and by applying a hard, quota-like limit on the 
number of Asian-American students at the school.  
Both legal challenges face uphill battles.  The Supreme Court, in its 
main affirmative-action precedents, has given universities permission 
to make use of race as a factor in pursuit of the compelling goal of 
student demographic diversity.  Put another way, the Court has 
effectively issued a license to discriminate based on race in favor of 
some groups—most notably Blacks and Hispanics—that would 
otherwise be underrepresented at their institutions based on 
conventional academic criteria.  But it is an undeniable fact that the 
places available at the most competitive and desirable institutions are 
limited relative to the number of applicants seeking them.  That means 
that freeing up places for Blacks and Hispanics (to achieve a “critical 
mass” of those student categories) necessarily entails admitting fewer 
students from higher-achieving groups—including Whites and 
especially Asian Americans.  This can only be done by holding such 
groups to higher academic standards and reducing their likelihood of 
gaining admission relative to other applicants.  In Glenn Loury’s 
words, this is “simple logic.”  In sum, the affirmative-action practices 
the Supreme Court permits will inexorably and necessarily result in 
discrimination against students from some groups at selective schools.   
This unavoidable equation means that Harvard University’s official 
litigation position that it does not practice bias against Asian-
American applicants is not only unnecessary under existing 
jurisprudence, but also illogical and transparently implausible.  These 
points were not completely lost on Allison Borroughs, the district judge 
on the Harvard case.  In ruling in the university’s favor, she effectively 
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acknowledged that the law allows Harvard to impose more exacting 
academic requirements on Asian-American applicants, and to reject a 
higher percentage of Asian Americans than Blacks, to achieve the all-
important goal of undergraduate racial diversity. In other words, 
Harvard can discriminate against Asian Americans to the degree 
necessary to achieve what the school regards as a sufficiently diverse 
student body. The clear implication is that, absent more restrictive 
rules (such as might exist under state law) than the Supreme Court 
has imposed, similar complaints against other competitive universities 
are also unlikely to succeed. Unless universities dramatically change 
their admissions practices—for example by downgrading or 
abandoning conventional merit-based metrics such as the SAT, which 
is already happening in some places—the juggernaut of affirmative 
action and its double standards will continue apace. 
Nonetheless, there are scenarios under which Harvard could still 
lose its case on appeal or in the Supreme Court (should it arrive there).  
Although taking account of race is precisely what Supreme Court 
precedent allows, the Court has articulated limits on the methods that 
can be used and the weight that can be assigned to race to achieve 
demographic balance. These limits furnish a potential basis for finding 
that Harvard has gone too far (as the Justice Department alleges Yale 
has done) under existing precedent. But even if the Supreme Court 
demands that Harvard curtail or modify its practices, the most likely 
outcome is that the university will still be allowed to limit the number 
of Asian-American (and/or White) undergraduates as a necessary step 
to freeing up spaces for Black and Hispanic students.  Race preferences 
will continue to be part of the admissions equation.   
Alternatively, albeit improbably, the Supreme Court could elect to 
use the Harvard case to tighten up significantly on its existing 
doctrine. One promising avenue would be to follow the suggestion, in 
concurring and dissenting opinions in past affirmative-action cases, 
that the Court abandon its deference to education “experts” by 
scrutinizing claims made on behalf of diversity more carefully and by 
adopting more exacting standards for evaluating its supposed 
educational benefits.  The Court could demand that universities 
precisely identify, measure, and demonstrate superior outcomes from 
diverse educational settings.  A useful natural experiment is presented 
by secondary schools such as the Bronx High School of Science and the 
Stuyvesant High School in New York City, and the Thomas Jefferson 
High School of Science and Technology in Fairfax County, Virginia.  
All of these schools are required by law to admit students solely on the 
basis of a competitive exam, with race-conscious selection verboten.  
This process has recently produced a student population that is 
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overwhelmingly Asian, with a miniscule number of Blacks and 
Hispanics. Is there any indication that the students at these schools 
learn less or otherwise suffer academically in palpable and 
demonstrable ways compared to those who attend schools with a 
greater demographic range of students? That is the type of question 
that the courts should be asking.  In general, the burden should be on 
the universities seeking to defend their affirmative-action practices to 
show with specificity whether and how a more varied demographic 
profile advances pedagogical effectiveness. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
The discussion so far has focused chiefly on affirmative action in 
the educational context, which is an area that has commanded 
outsized attention from the courts and legal commentators. What 
about affirmative action in the workplace?  Recent events may prompt 
renewed interest in that topic.  National soul-searching in the wake of 
the death of George Floyd in police hands has spawned a raft of 
pledges by companies, firms, corporations, foundations, and other 
“woke” organizations to increase the numbers of underrepresented 
minorities in their staff ranks, with some even promising to achieve 
percentage targets and goals reminiscent of job quotas.  The 
centerpiece of the “antiracist” initiatives undertaken by this growing 
list is a commitment to creating a more diverse workplace.  Although 
not expressly disavowing remediation, public pronouncements have 
repeatedly emphasized the prime importance of enhancing workplace 
“diversity, equity, and inclusion” to reflect the profile of groups in 
society as a whole, and especially to increase Blacks’ presence in the 
full array of jobs from top to bottom.   
The shift from remediation to diversity in the rhetoric of workplace 
affirmative action, which recapitulates what has occurred in education, 
can be understood as proceeding from similar real-world conditions, 
disappointments, and failures.  The “rightful position” measure of 
racial justice proceeds from the expectation that the temporary use of 
race preferences will eventually enable Blacks to compete effectively 
and to qualify, without a race-conscious boost, for the range of jobs and 
occupational positions in proportion to their numbers.  As in the 
education sphere, that employment goal has so far proved elusive.  
Decades after the enactment the Civil Rights Act, and in spite of a 
plethora of policies, programs, and initiatives across an array of 
domains, race-based preferences are still necessary in order to 
maintain a significant Black presence in many workplace positions, 
and especially in the most demanding, remunerative, and skill-
intensive.  Given the profile of qualifications of Blacks as compared to 
other groups in society, there is no indication that “equity,” as it has 
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now come to be designated (which means equal outcomes), can be 
achieved without continuing race-conscious interventions and every 
reason to believe these will be needed indefinitely. 
The emphasis on diversity can be seen as an adjustment to this 
reality.  As in the case of education, embracing diversity as the 
principal rationale for race preferences in employment does not entail 
the expectation that race-conscious personnel practices will be or can 
be phased out in the foreseeable future.  The workplace is facing 
“affirmative action forever.” 
III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE GOAL OF INCREASING 
“DIVERSITY” TO JUSTIFY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE WORKPLACE 
Renewed efforts to increase racial diversity in employment to the 
point of achieving proportional representation and “racial equity” raise 
important legal and practical questions. As Melvin Urofsky notes, the 
Supreme Court has declined to forbid voluntary, private race-conscious 
affirmative action programs under Title VII, despite explicit language 
in the statute that would seem to place them off-limits in many cases, 
and despite the Court’s own repeated, albeit erratic, endorsement of 
the need for narrow tailoring and proof of specific infractions under 
longstanding remedial conventions and doctrines.  In United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979), as Urofsky explains, Justice 
William Brennan’s majority opinion “somehow managed to find that 
the explicit wording of Title VII prohibiting racial discrimination did 
not foreclose [a] private race-conscious affirmative action plan[ ]” so 
long as the plan was “transitional in nature . . .  designed to correct 
statistical imbalances . . . and allowed flexibility in hiring non-
minorities.”  The Court did not justify its permission in that case on 
specific findings of past discrimination by the employer or union that 
implemented the plan. Rather, it relied on the generalized remedial 
goal of “eliminat[ing] present and future discrimination” as well as 
“wip[ing] out the burden of past discrimination.” Because that objective 
was within the “spirit of the authors of the Civil Rights Act” even if 
contrary to its precise terms, the Court permitted the race-conscious 
initiative at issue in that case to stand. 
The Supreme Court has never expressly repudiated or overruled 
Weber, but it is unclear how the Court would apply it today, especially 
in light of its recent embrace of a strict textualist reading of Title VII 
in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). Based on this development, the 
Court could choose to invoke the colorblind language of Title VII or the 
statute’s disavowal of a numerical balancing requirement to severely 
curtail Weber, perhaps by limiting race-based hiring to a corrective for 
specific instances of proven past or present discrimination. But even if 
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the Supreme Court declines to take that course, it is unclear whether 
the degree of race-consciousness that employers would need to deploy 
in many cases to achieve racial “equity” would satisfy the caveats and 
limitations in Weber, including the rejection of quotas and rigid 
numerical goals, as well as the requirement, still alive and well, that 
affirmative-action programs be transitory in duration. 
One important and underappreciated fact that is central to the fate 
of the aggressive “racial equity” measures many employers have 
promised is that the Supreme Court has never expressly recognized 
diversity as a legitimate, let alone compelling, justification for race-
conscious decision-making in the employment context. In fact, 
education is the only sphere in which the Supreme Court has expressly 
acknowledged any legitimate interest in maintaining diversity.     
A key question is thus whether the courts would, and should, accept 
the goal of enhancing workplace diversity as valid basis for race-
conscious personnel decisions. For many reasons, the blanket 
permission to advance diversity that the Supreme Court has granted to 
higher education, whether defensible or not, should not be extended to 
the workplace. Specifically, the courts should refuse to assume that 
diversity is desirable enough as a general matter to justify race 
preferences in hiring and promotion. Rather, race-conscious decisions 
should be permitted only in particular instances where an employer 
can specifically demonstrate that creating a more diversified workforce 
than would otherwise result without the deliberate use of race 
preferences generates net concrete benefits for the enterprise overall in 
light of its central mission and purpose. It is far from clear a priori how 
commonly such net benefits would result or could be shown. An honest 
assessment may sometimes, and maybe often, reveal no identifiable, 
tangible, or measurably positive payoffs.  Or the downsides of pursuing 
something like proportional group representation in the workplace will 
outweigh the upsides.   
The main reason that the Supreme Court’s educational affirmative-
action jurisprudence should not control in the workplace is that the 
two settings are incomparable and serve entirely different purposes.  
Schools are sites of teaching, learning, developing human capital, and 
preparing young people for constructive citizenship.  The “expert” 
consensus, upon which the courts have heavily relied, is that exposing 
students to people from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds 
advances these goals, with the benefits sufficiently substantial and 
important to justify race-conscious selection. Moreover, the relatively 
narrow and well-defined set of objectives that institutions of higher 
education share make it reasonable to assume that a diverse student 
body will have similar positive effects on the educational experience 
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across the board.  (Curiously, though, the Supreme Court has not 
extended this assumption to K–12 education.)  It therefore makes 
sense for the courts to adopt a general rule for race-conscious efforts in 
the educational sphere. 
But employment is fundamentally different from education. Quite 
simply, the purpose of the workplace is not pedagogical.  Rather, 
employees are hired and paid to do a job, deliver a service, produce a 
product, and complete specified tasks.  The ordinary expectation is 
that their activities will contribute to the employing entity’s 
profitability or at least to preserving its solvency.  This requires the 
efficient and effective operation of the enterprise at issue, and workers 
are expected to contribute to that state of affairs.  Additionally, 
employing entities are much more variable than educational 
institutions on dimensions that bear on whether a diverse workforce 
and the steps needed to produce and maintain it create a net positive 
or negative effect.  Although employing organizations share the goal of 
economic viability, they vary dramatically in function, purpose, size, 
type, and mode of operation.  They also present their staff with a 
spectrum of job demands and employment situations, ranging from 
complex, intricate teamwork to solitary, self-directed production.  
Given these realities, it is far from obvious that a diverse set of 
workers can be counted on to best serve the objectives of each and 
every employer across the entire economy, regardless of the 
organization, firm, business, or activity at issue, or the attributes, 
availability, and responsibilities of potential workers.   
Accordingly, the courts should not assume that achieving workplace 
diversity is a “compelling interest” that always justifies a departure 
from race-neutral principles.  Nor should the judicial acceptance of 
demographic diversity as a compelling interest for education 
automatically carry over into the employment sphere.  Rather, hiring 
entities and managers should be required to justify race-conscious 
practices for diversity purposes on a case-by-case basis by 
demonstrating the concrete benefits of diversifying workforce 
composition in their specific operational settings using accepted, well-
defined, quantitative metrics like productivity, profits, quality services, 
and growth, or other appropriate and precise metrics. Certainly the 
courts should not simply defer to employers’ assertions that a more 
diverse workforce actually delivers favorable outcomes without clear 
evidence of that result.   
The employer’s burden will not be easy to carry.  It is today widely 
assumed that enhancing workforce diversity is an unalloyed positive.  
But despite all the feel-good platitudes extolling the virtues of racial, 
ethnic, (and gender) mixing in the workplace and repeated invocations 
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of the mantra that “diversity is our strength,” the advantages of 
creating a more racially and ethnically varied staff, and especially of 
increasing the number of workers from underrepresented groups than 
would otherwise result from colorblind hiring practices, are speculative 
and unproven.  The social science on the question is sparse, spotty, and 
equivocal, and the results decidedly mixed.  Given the paucity and type 
of evidence, it is just as plausible to assume that hiring individuals 
from similar backgrounds is a better practice, or that workplace 
uniformity operates more effectively in many settings.  Historical 
examples of decidedly undiverse teams producing outstanding results 
are not hard to find.  The Apollo 11 moon mission was run mostly by 
White guys with buzz cuts. They put a man on the moon. Would a 
team with significantly more women or minorities have done a better 
job? The staff at Bletchley Park who unscrambled the German Enigma 
machine and cracked the Nazi secret war code consisted mostly of 
young, male, well-educated, Caucasian British citizens.2 Their 
successful efforts proved crucial to an Allied victory in World War II.  
The highly lucrative Belgian diamond trade has for centuries been 
almost entirely run by a small group of Orthodox Jewish merchants 
based in Antwerp. None of these examples—and there are many 
more—rules out the possibility that more diverse teams would 
sometimes do a better job.  But whether, when, and under what 
circumstances is ultimately an empirical question. A priori 
generalizations are baseless, and any determinations on the question 
must proceed piecemeal.  Moreover, any rigorous assessments must 
take into account that, in our increasingly racially and ethnically 
mixed country, some degree of diversity will already spontaneously 
exist in many jobs and workplaces without race preferences, even if not 
strictly proportional to all population groups. This means that the 
supposed benefits of the enhanced diversity traceable to such 
preferences will, in many cases, be merely incremental.   
Also essential to evaluating the desirability of diversification efforts 
is a substantial and solid body of evidence, accumulated over decades, 
that steps taken to achieve greater racial balancing in the workplace 
can carry costs that result from the hiring and promotion of less 
competent employees.  Studies by industrial and organizational 
psychologists have long revealed that qualifications, skills, experience, 
interests, abilities, and educational credentials vary significantly 
across racial and ethnic groups in American society, with Blacks and, 
to a lesser extent, Hispanics lagging on average behind Whites and 
Asian Americans on parameters that predict job performance. This 
 
2 See generally Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code 
(2000) (telling the stories of the men who cracked the Enigma code). 
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means that increasing the presence of Blacks and other 
underrepresented minorities virtually always requires accepting lower 
hiring standards and relaxing well-established, meritocratic selection 
criteria.  Because many common personnel screens employers have 
adopted have been shown to predict productivity and performance, 
altering them can result in a less capable workforce that can impose 
costs on firms and organizations.  Among the industrial experts who 
study workplace productivity, this pattern is known as the validity-
diversity trade-off.  The data show also that negative effects become 
more pronounced as jobs become more selective, competitive, and 
demanding of high-level skills, because the paucity of workers from 
less qualified groups at those levels becomes more pronounced.   
These documented realities are, and should be, pertinent to the 
legal bona fides of race-conscious employment initiatives.  As a general 
rule, companies pledged to pursue racial “equity” either downplay or 
ignore costs to the enterprise associated with diversity efforts and 
many would bristle at the suggestion, or at least at the open 
acknowledgment, that any trade-offs exist between hiring greater 
numbers of underrepresented minorities and an employer’s effective 
operation and organizational interests.  The trade-offs, however, are 
real.  Although the balance of costs and benefits will vary somewhat 
across different occupations and economic sectors, present racial and 
ethnic differences in educational achievement, qualifications, and 
skills mean that negative effects will exist, and especially for highly 
selective and sophisticated positions.  Courts charged with deciding 
whether diversity in employment serves a “compelling” interest or any 
legitimate interest at all should not allow employers to sidestep the 
possibility of these effects.  They should force employers to account for 
both downsides and upsides, costs as well as benefits, of the race-
conscious measures they adopt.  More specifically, any legal 
assessment should consider how race-conscious organizational 
practices affect merit-based hiring, job-related qualifications 
demanded for particular positions, and the changes in customary 
criteria for staffing and hiring.  A critical and searching look at the 
impact of these parameters on the employing organization should be 
an essential part of any inquiry. 
To be sure, affirmative action in the educational setting likewise 
carries costs, which are routinely minimized or simply denied. 
Competitive universities must ordinarily relax their customary 
academic standards, at least for some students, to achieve the diversity 
they seek.  The consequences of that adjustment, however, are much 
debated.  Whether universities can accomplish their central mission 
despite the presence of some groups of students who are less 
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academically proficient is a complex question that admits of no 
straightforward answer.  In contrast, the use of race-conscious 
personnel methods for the purpose of increasing workplace diversity is 
a far simpler matter.  Defending that practice would appear difficult, if 
not impossible, if it fails to advance legitimate business interests or 
entails a sacrifice of firm productivity, efficiency, or effectiveness.  
Absent concrete and demonstrable benefits, a firm’s desire to socially 
engineer a workplace that “looks like America” for its own sake should 
not count as an acceptable reason to deviate from the colorblind 
mandate expressly written into the law.  Likewise, judges should not 
uncritically accept the oft-heard assertion that increasing workplace 
diversity enhances an organization’s ability to serve its minority 
clients more effectively.  For instance, Black and other minority health 
care workers are claimed to generate superior outcomes for patients 
from underserved groups.  These statements are easy to make but 
hard to prove, and their validity should not be assumed.  Yet another 
reason employers give for pursuing diversity is to cater to customers or 
clients who prefer to do business with companies that employ a 
demographically varied workforce.  Courts have traditionally rejected 
customer preference as grounds for departing from race neutrality, and 
there is a long history of minority exclusion on that basis.  They should 
likewise be reluctant to permit employers to justify affirmative action 
from similar motives.  That such demands might be made for idealistic 
reasons or based on political convictions should carry no weight.  
Pursuing diversity for its own sake or because clients, managers, or 
other important and influential people regard it as appealing, 
desirable, or “the right thing to do,” cannot be allowed to overcome the 
explicit legal protections against discrimination written into Title VII.  
In sum, it should be incumbent on organizations that adopt race-
conscious methods to show that their hiring practices actually advance 
their core mission and legitimate business purposes.  Other rationales 
should not suffice. 
CONCLUSION 
There are at least two potential impediments to the courts taking a 
harder line on race preferences in the workplace than for education.  
First, the prohibition on making employment decisions “because of” 
race or other protected categories in Title VII, which can ground 
complaints of employers’ unlawful disparate treatment, has also given 
rise to the doctrine of disparate impact, which imposes liability for 
employment practices that produce deviations from proportional group 
representation without an affirmative demonstration of “business 
necessity.” An employer faced with making that showing has an 
incentive to use race-conscious methods (that is, to act “because of” 
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race) to achieve proportional representation, thus escaping the 
presumption of liability.  Because the disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact doctrines potentially subject employers to conflicting 
demands, allowing employers to cite the goal of diversity to justify 
race-conscious selection would enable the courts to ease the tensions 
between the two.  The temptation to grant that permission should be 
resisted.  A better and more realistic course would be to curtail 
disparate-impact liability or abolish it altogether.  The latter would 
require congressional action in light of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which 
validates the disparate-impact discrimination doctrine articulated in 
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971).  Even without any significant change in 
the positive law, however, the courts have considerable leeway to 
revise judicially crafted aspects of the doctrine by adopting more 
flexible and less stringent standards for disparate-impact liability.  As 
I have argued elsewhere, the courts should abandon the unreasonable 
expectation that all groups will be represented proportionately 
throughout the workforce and instead should rely more heavily on data 
showing the actual profile of ability, talents, interests, and 
qualifications for different groups.  The disparate-impact doctrine 
should be modified to negate the presumption of liability for the broad 
range of numerical imbalances that are to be expected in light of these 
group differences. 
Another possibility is that employers who face challenges to overtly 
race-conscious efforts to hire more underrepresented workers could 
revert to defending their practices as a remedy for past societal 
discrimination, which is a rationale that the Supreme Court has 
sometimes accepted, albeit implicitly, as a basis for voluntary 
affirmative-action programs such as the one at issue in Weber.  
Although the courts have mostly disfavored vague and open-ended 
invocations of generalized discrimination as the basis for race-
conscious initiatives, that rationale has not been definitively 
repudiated.  The courts could choose to breathe new life into 
affirmative action as a corrective for “societal discrimination” by 
invoking the now popular and pervasive parlance of “systemic” and 
“structural” racism.  Reviving and broadening the remedial project, 
which lies closer to the core of the civil-rights laws’ purposes than the 
pursuit of diversity, is a doctrinally tempting way to sidestep the 
empirical weaknesses of the diversity justification in the employment 
context.  But the courts should firmly reject that ploy, however 
fashionable at the moment, as an unwarranted and ungrounded end 
run around longstanding principles of remedial fairness.  In contrast to 
claims of specific and defined instances of discrimination, allegations 
based on “systemic” or “structural” racism make use of imprecise, 
unsubstantiated, and protean categories that are subject to ready 
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manipulation for partisan purposes.  Such concepts tend to corrode 
impartial meritocratic principles and can be deployed indefinitely to 
the disadvantage of social groups, such as White males, that become 
disfavored or targeted by politically powerful factions.  If anything, the 
Supreme Court should use any challenges to aggressive workplace 
initiatives grounded in the rhetoric of “structural racism” as 
opportunities to narrow rather than expand the reach of Weber, which 
not only flies in the face of the express language of Title VII, but flouts 
longstanding requirements of proof of actual legal violations and 
specific findings of liability before remedial measures can be 
implemented under Anglo-American law. 
Whether courts will be confronted with any of these issues depends 
critically on whether and to what extent the newly articulated and 
widespread promises to pursue workplace “equity” are actually kept, 
and whether and what kind of legal challenges are brought to these 
practices.  These issues remain to be resolved in the future. 
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